The word "punishment" has different meanings depending on the context in which it is used, some of them very different. For this we should start mentioning its scope. I will use "punishment" to refer to (1) an infringing act is suffering (or other consequences normally considered unpleasant), (2) is carried out in response to the violation of a rule, (3) which is imposed and carried out by the authorities who issued the rule, or by persons bound by other rules of the regulatory system to which the rule breached, (4) that expresses a sentiment of disapprobation (social or personal) to the offender, and (5) which is seen as a just retribution for the offense committed (cf. Hart 1994, Ross 1976, Rabossi 1976).
We examine in more detail two aspects of this definition, for the purpose of making it operational. The first has to do with what it means to be bound by a rule to make certain conduct (or refrain from it.) This is crucial to make sense of the requirements (2) and (3). The second will be to refine the concept of pay to be able to differentiate the effects of revenge, and thus allow the classification of particular behaviors in one way or another.
Following Hart, we say that "a rule imposing obligations when the general demand for conformity is insistent and the social pressure on those who deviate or threaten to make it big ... When pressure in the forms of physical sanctions are prominent or are unusual, although not precisely defined and are administered by officials, but their implementation is left the community in general, be inclined to classify the rules as a rudimentary or primitive form of law .... What is worth noting that the emphasis on the importance or seriousness of the social pressure that lies behind the rules is the primary factor determining them to be conceived as giving rise to obligations. "(Hart 1963: 107-08) .
The existence of social rules that give both the rating basis of conduct as an offense or wrong, as the imposition of penalties is crucial to sustain the existence of a remuneration policy (a rudimentary form of law as characterized Hart) . "Criminal law is something we obey or disobey; what their rules require duty is qualified. If we disobey is said to have been a "violation" to the right and that what we've done is legally "wrong" ("wrong"), the "breach of duty" or a "crime" ("offense"). The criminal law serves to establish and define such conduct as something that should be omitted or performed by those to whom the Act applies, whatever their wishes. The penalty or sanction "charged to the rules or violations of criminal law seeks to create a reason for men to refrain from such activities (although the punishment can serve other purpose). "(Hart 1963: 34). "For the judge, punish, take the ruler as a guide and the breach as the reason and justification of punishment to the offender ... The same applies to informal censorship by the transgression of rules is not legal ... We say that censor or punish a man because he violated the rule ... "(Hart 1963: 13). These features are also crucial, as discussed below, to establish a clear boundary between retribution and revenge.
As Nozick (1981: 366-68) there are at least five significant differences between punishment understood as retribution and revenge (although de las similitudes estructurales que el mismo autor reconoce entre ambas formas de responder a una ofensa). “In drawing these contrast between retribution and revenge, I do not deny that can be mixed cases, or that people can be moved by mixed motives, partially a desire for retribution, partially a desire for revenge, or that a stated desire can mask another one that is operative. Usually, it is charged that those favoring retribution really crave revenge; but this will be especially implausible in the absence of a special tie to the victim... The charge itself, though, recognizes the distinction, even as it seeks to blur it. That retribution can be distinguished from revenge and is, on its surface at least, less primitive neither shows that, nor explains why, retribution is justified. Nor does it retribution and revenge Explain why Often Have Been so confused. "(Nozick 1981: 368).
(1) the remuneration is in response to misconduct, conduct that violates a rule of the community, while revenge may be carried out by an injury, harm or disrespect, do not have to be a misnomer .
(2) the remuneration set an internal limit commensurate with the gravity of the misconduct to determine the extent of punishment to be imposed, while vengeance sets no such limit to the damage it can inflict (although Avenger can be limited in its response razones externas). “The punishment deserve depends on the magnitude H of the wrongness of the act, and the person’s degree of responsibility r for the act, and is equal in magnitude to their product, r x H. The degree of responsibility r varies between one (full responsibility) and zero (no responsibility), and may take intermediate numerical values corresponding to partial responsibility... The magnitud H is a measure of the wrongness of harm, done or intended, of the act.” (Nozick 1981: 363). “Revenge is a private matter: the party wronged –wether it be the actual victim o the victim’s relatives or friends- takes the responsibility for seeing that justice is done. For this reason, the penalty the wrongdoer faces What is limited only by the victim is willing and Able to do in Retaliation ... Revenge has to dig a Historically Be Disproportionate to the Offense original. "(Wilkes 1999: 23).
(3) vengeance is a personal matter, is made "for what you've done to my ____ (same father, group, wife, brother, etc..)." But the one who pays does not need any special or personal tie to the victim of the misconduct for which compensation is required. "Revenge May Involve differing Notions of linkage: (a) Because of What you did to my ______; (b) Because of What you did to me. If someone kills your father, under linkage to him kill you while you kill b under His Father. " (Nozick 1981: 367). The agents can exert revenge on behalf of someone who has a personal reason to carry it out, but the desire of third parties that someone running a vengeance can not be understood as a desire for revenge in the strict sense. The compensation, however, may be desired or inflicted by people without any personal relationship with the victim of the offense.
(4) revenge awakens an emotional reaction, a certain pleasure in the suffering of others, while the remuneration does not require any particular emotional tone or imply any feeling of pleasure associated with that justice. That is why the avenger often want to witness the suffering of those to whom it is addressed revenge, while in cases of pay there is no special interest in witnessing the suffering that is inflicted.
(5) revenge does not aspire to any degree of generality. The need for revenge emerges as the way in which the injured party feels at the time of suffering. Nothing to avenge other acts committed in the future (or have the need I had done in the past). Instead, he imposes a fee-inflicting the punishment for misconduct, "acts under the existence of any general rule which requires giving back the same way similar acts. In addition, it is likely which alludes to the existence of these rules during the imposition of punishment, because they are its justification.
not discuss the correctness of this approach in this entry, because the goal is to apply the theoretical framework in the interpretation of a film. Barton (1999: 56-68) disagrees with each of these five hallmarks, considering that excludes revenge as a form of justice without justification. The application will Nozick's proposal can also be understood as testing for the purpose of determining their validity.
REFERENCES Barton, Charles KB 1999. Getting even. Revenge as a form of justice . Chicago-La Salle: Open Court.
Hart, HLA 1963. The concept of law , BA, Abeledo-Perrot.
Hart, HLA 1992. Punishment and Responsibility. Essays in the philosophy of law . Oxford: Clarendon Press. Original edition, 1968.
Nozick, Robert. 1981. Philosophical Explanations . Oxford: Clarendon Press.
Rabossi, Eduardo. 1976. The moral justification of punishment . Buenos Aires: Astrea.
Ross, Alf. 1976. "The purpose of punishment." In law, philosophy and language. Homenaje a Ambrosio l. Gioia, ed. Genaro Carrio :151-192. Buenos Aires: Astrea.
SETPOINTS WORK
Find an example of retribution and revenge on another film Inglourious Basterds . Justify your choice.
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